Michael Harari is a former Israeli diplomat. He served as ambassador to Cyprus from 2010 to 2015, after postings in Cairo and London.
A researcher at Mitvim, the Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, and a lecturer at the Jezreel Valley College, he has taken part in the informal Israeli-Turkish dialogue.
In his view, the rivalry between Ankara and Israel in Syria is one of competition rather than confrontation, and it remains manageable as long as Washington acts as arbiter.
Interview by Henrik Werenskiold
Under Erdoğan, relations between Israel and Turkey were slowly deteriorating. Did 7 October change everything?
Yes, radically. Under Erdoğan the relationship has been chaotic, but it has had decent periods, and for more than fifteen years there was talk of gas cooperation. Since 7 October the situation has clearly deteriorated, because of opposing positions on the Palestinian question and above all on Hamas. Unlike many countries that criticise Israeli policy, Turkey sees Hamas as a resistance movement rather than a terrorist organisation. It has also hardened its policy: an economic boycott and many other measures.
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas review the guard of honour in Ankara, July 2023. (Riza Özel/Dia Images via AP)
Why is Erdoğan so vehement? His sympathies for the Muslim Brotherhood, Turkish ambitions, Ottoman nostalgia?
I see two main reasons. The first is the Palestinian question, which his Muslim Brotherhood ideology leads him to regard as central; hence his reading of Hamas, very different from that of many countries, Arab ones included. The second is Syria. Since Ahmad al-Sharaa replaced Bashar al-Assad, the Israeli-Turkish relationship has taken on the appearance of a competition. Ankara rightly saw in the new regime an opportunity to extend its influence. Israel, for its part, looks at al-Sharaa with a large question mark: where is he heading, to what extent will his past dictate his policy, and how far will he submit to Turkish influence?
What zone of influence is Turkey seeking in Syria, and what are Israel’s red lines?
Despite their differences, the two countries recognise each other’s legitimate interests. It took them time to digest the new reality, Israel more than Turkey, which is very close to al-Sharaa. Today each understands better, if not perfectly, where its zone of influence must stop. The American factor is decisive: for Washington, both countries are major allies.
Israel accepts that Turkey should have substantial influence in northern Syria, near its border. Turkey accepts, I suppose, that Israel should have its own on the Golan and in the south, and that al-Sharaa should govern as independently as possible. A grey zone remains. Last August’s strike (editor’s note: Israel bombed an air base in Syria to prevent it from rebuilding an air force with Turkish support) marked a turning point: each side took better measure of the other’s vital interests and of the need for a more finely calibrated approach. Talk of « red lines » is a little vague, but both countries know that any misunderstanding must be avoided.
Syria reunified by Ahmad al-Sharaa. © Fabrice Balanche.
Al-Sharaa, a former al-Qaeda member, has he really reformed? And could Turkey, like Iran with Hezbollah, use jihadist groups against Israel?
Al-Sharaa remains a question mark for the whole world. But he is in Damascus, without yet controlling the entire country, and the international community, led by Washington, Ankara and Riyadh, accepted his regime very quickly, in a very « Trump » manner, despite his past. The main point is that his arrival drove Iran out of Syria and reduced its influence over Hezbollah accordingly. That is crucial for Israel, the United States and the whole region.
As for a Turkey taking over from Iran, some in Israel fear it, but the comparison is exaggerated. Despite the rhetoric and the confrontational policies, Turkey is not Iran. It is not an ally of Israel, but it is a NATO member and close to the United States. One should therefore see this as a competition rather than a confrontation: a competition can be managed, interests can be balanced within it, and that is what is happening today.
Ahmad al-Sharaa welcomes European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa to Damascus, 9 January 2026. © Wikipedia.
Erdoğan, close to Hamas, does he really believe in a win-win competition with Israel?
His intentions are clear: to extend his influence as far as possible, especially since the war against Iran. Consider the Riyadh pact between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey. It has not yet taken concrete form, but it sketches out the Middle East that follows American domination. For Israel, that is a genuine concern, because Erdoğan’s regime is indeed a Muslim Brotherhood regime. But the competition can be managed if each side remains rational, especially with a third party such as Washington, which weighs heavily on both.
Between the Israeli hawks who call for striking Turkey and the Turkish Islamists who want to wipe Israel off the map, does the rhetoric not risk becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy?
Israeli public discourse on Turkey is very negative. To my surprise, it very quickly replaced Iran as the next threat, because of the new Syrian situation, and this perception could become reality as Syria stabilises. The same is true on both sides. The spiral is possible, but in recent months the two countries have managed to balance their expectations, which would not have been the case without American mediation. Much will also depend on what happens next week in Israel, in Washington and in Iran. For now, the game remains manageable, but let us stay cautious.
« For now, the game remains manageable, but let us stay cautious. »
Does the alliance between Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan target Israel or Iran?
I will be blunt: it does not target Israel. The war against Iran showed that the American umbrella had poorly protected Gulf interests, and Washington is signalling, despite Trump’s rhetoric, that it does not want to be too involved. Saudi Arabia is the weak link, exposed to Iranian and then Houthi attacks that this umbrella does not stop. Pakistan is the big winner: it has established itself, surprisingly, as the region’s foremost mediator. Turkey is partly a winner, partly a loser: it sees an opportunity to extend its influence, but worries about Israel’s military successes against Iran and its ability to draw Washington along. This pact stems from American policy: everyone is wondering about the Middle East that comes next.
« Pakistan is the big winner: it has established itself, surprisingly, as the region’s foremost mediator. »
Could it not turn against Israel, especially as Turkish ambitions in Syria and Lebanon clash with its interests?
It is clearly about taking advantage of Iranian weakness and, later, about being able to face Israel. But to see it today as an alliance directed against one or the other is a mistake. These three actors are positioning themselves in a highly uncertain future Middle East, notably as regards American policy, in which Iran will be weaker and Israel stronger. This pact is often presented in Israel as very dangerous; I do not believe that, not at this stage. It could change depending on how the region evolves.
So it is an insurance against Iran, perhaps tomorrow against Israel, and against American disengagement?
Yes, exactly.
